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Abstrat
We present data on debt aumulation in Australia and the United
States, and tentative data on Romania, to pose the question of whether
Romania might experiene a redit runh as a result of the US sub-
prime nanial risis. We develop a model of a redit runh in a pure
redit eonomy with endogenous money reation, to show how hanges
in bank lending praties and borrower repayment behaviour an bring
about an eonomi deline.
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As this paper goes to press, Ameria's Dow Jones stokmarket index is
oially in a orretiondened as a fall of more than ten perent fall from
a previous peak. More ominously, Amerian house pries are more than eight
perent below their peak, and are urrently falling at a rate that exeeds one
perent per monthan unpreedented rate of deline.
Figure 1: Dow Jones Industrial Average [16℄ & Case-Shiller Housing Prie
Index [15℄
The proximate ause of this shakeout in Amerian asset markets is the
so-alled subprime lending risis. Professional opinions dier on how long
this risis will last and how serious its onsequenes will be, but the minimum
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expetation is that a reession as olloquially dened (two quarters or more
of negative growth) will result.
In this paper we suggest that the onsequenes ould be muh more severe.
The basis of our pessimism is a loser look at the broader phenomenon of
whih the subprime risis is merely the latest installment: a multi-deade
trend for private debt to rise faster than inome.
Researh by Australia's entral bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia (Bat-
tellino 2007), indiates that over the three deades from 1977 to 2007, private
debt (the sum of business and household debt) has risen faster than nominal
GDP in 15 of the major OECD nations (the only signiant exeption is
Frane).
On this gauge, the US debt phenomenon no longer appears espeially
remarkable. Though the USA's ratio of private debt to GDP more than
doubled over those three deades, this inrease was at the low end of the
international sale, whih ranged from a maximum of an elevenfold inrease
for The Netherlands to a doubling for Germany (Japan is a speial ase,
whih we disuss later). The median experiene has been that of Australia,
whose private debt to GDP ratio has risen threefold in the last 30 years
and sixfold sine the mid-1960s. The rise in private indebtedness is therefore
a global phenomenonwhih we argue is unsustainable, and must at some
point reverse. When it does, the eonomi irumstanes will be very dierent
to those that have applied for the past three deades. We will pass from a
debt-driven eonomy to one dominated by a redit runh.
1 From the mid-60s till 2008: the debt-driven
eonomy
The growth in debt illustrated by the above harts has a profound impat
upon eonomi performane that is negleted by onventional eonomi anal-
ysis, whih ignores the role of monetary fators in eonomis.
Aggregate demand in an eonomy for everything from ommodities to
assetstehnially, Gross National Expenditureis the sum of inome and
the hange in debt. When debt levels are low ompared to GDP, the on-
tribution from hange in debt is negligible, and this monetary side of the
eonomy an omfortably be ignored. But when debt levels beome large
ompared to GDP, muh of the eetive demandand the majority of the
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Figure 2: RBA researh on private debt to GDP aross the OECD [1℄
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Figure 3: USA data [19℄; Australian data [14℄
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volatility in eonomi performane--is driven by hanges in debt. Monetary
fators are no longer eonomially irrelevant. Australia's reent eonomi
history learly illustrates this shift from an eonomy where monetary fators
an be ignored, to one where they are dominant.
As noted above, Australia's debt to GDP history is loser to the mean
for all OECD ountries than that of the USA. Also, even though Australia's
eonomy is urrently performing well, while Ameria's is now feared to be in
reession after the ollapse of the subprime market, Australia's eonomi his-
tory also provides a learer example than Ameria of a speulation-dominated
eonomy.
In the 1950s and early 1960s, when Australia's private debt was less than
25% of GDP, annual hanges in debt ontributed less than 5 perent to Gross
National Expenditure. That hanged markedly in 1973, when the rst and
smallest of three reent "super-bubbles" in debt ourred (see Figure 3).
Briey, the hange in debt that year aounted for 10 perent of nominal
GNE (see Figure 4).
Simultaneously, the great 1970s inationary surge began, and unemploy-
ment in Australia exploded from its previous histori level of below two
perent, to over six perent. Most eonomists blamed the downturn on poor
government eonomi poliy and ination, but the real ause was the ollapse
in speulative bubble that the growth in debt had naned. With the bubble
over, speulators shifted from willingly taking on debt, to trying desperately
to redue it. The rate of growth of debt fell well below the rate of ina-
tion, and the hange in debt went from boosting real aggregate demand to
subtrating from it. The Australian eonomy went into its rst post-WWII
reessionaused by a derease in the rate of growth of private debt.
The dependene on debt beame even more extreme as debt rose from
44% of GDP in 1973 to 85% in 1990, during the next debt super-bubble. At
the peak of that bubble, inreases in private debt aounted for almost 14% of
aggregate demand. This was a huge redit-driven boost to the eonomy while
it lasted, but when it went into reverse the hange in debt turned negative,
and redutions in debt redued nominal GNE by almost 1.5 perent. Real
GNE fell by substantially more, sine ination dropped along with the fall in
debt. The eonomy entered into its deepest post-WWII reession yet, with
unemployment exeeding 11 perent.
We fae the dilemma that with high debt levels, eonomi performane
beomes dependent on the further aumulation of debt. When debt is small,
or hanging by only small amounts, most variation in eonomi performane
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Figure 4: Data soure: [14℄
is due to real produtive fators. But when debt is muh larger than output,
hanges in debt ontribute disproportionately to hanges in apparent eo-
nomi performane. Ironially, superially good eonomi performane
suh as falling unemployment--beomes dependent on ultimately unsustain-
able further inreases in debt.
This is apparent in the orrelation between unemployment and hange in
debt in the Australian data. In the 50s and 60s, when debt was under 25% of
GDP, hanges in debt made a omparatively small ontribution to hanges
in eetive demand, and hene the orrelation between hanges in debt and
hanges in unemployment was small (and positive).
However, as debt rose relative to GDP, hanges in debt made a muh
larger ontribution to hanges in eetive demand, and hene to hanges
in unemployment. The orrelation between hanges in debt and hanges
in unemployment onsequently inreased in magnitude as debt aumulated
over time. Now, that orrelation has stabilized at more than -90 perent--
whih means that a deline in the rate of growth of debt is highly likely to
be orrelated with an inrease in the level of unemployment (see Figures 5
and 7).
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Figure 5: Data soure: [14℄
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Figure 6: Data soure: [19℄.
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A similar observation applies to the Amerian eonomy (see Figures 6 and
7). The orrelation of hanges in private debt with unemployment is more
volatile than in the Australian asein part beause of the omparatively
massive ontributions from hanges in government and nanial setor debt
to Amerian demand. But learly the Australian and Amerian eonomies,
in onert with 13 other major OECD nations, have beome "addited to
debt".
Figure 7: Data soure: [14℄
This is the most onventionally eonomi danger faing the world eon-
omy as the US subprime risis spreads. As households go from willingly
taking on more debt to trying to redue their indebtedness, the hange in
debt will go from boosting aggregate demand to subtrating from it. The
1990s ollapse in debt levels aused unemployment in Australia to rise from
six to eleven perentyet in 1990, the hange in debt was responsible for
"only" 14 perent of GNE. Today, it aounts for over 18 perent of GNE.
Similarly in the USA, when the debt-driven omponent of nominal GNE
dropped from 10 to 2 perent aross the 1990s reession, unemployment
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rose from 5 to almost 8 perent. Today, inreasing debt aounts for 14
perent of US GNEand the subprime risis learly marks the end of this
latest and biggest debt bubble. The maroeonomi impat of the swith
from expanding to ontrating debt levels is likely to result in the deepest
reession in the USA's post-WWII eonomi history.
Figure 8: Data soures: [18℄, [19℄, [14℄
Sine so muh of the OECD is in a similar debt-driven state to Ameria,
the turnaround in debt that is ourring there is likely to be repliated aross
muh of the OECD. It is therefore highly likely that at least an OECD-wide
reession will our, if not a global reession. If so, this will be the rst
time in Romania's post-Revolution eonomi history that external eonomi
onditions have been ontrationary rather than expansionary. What are the
impliations of this for Romania itself?
Obviously this depends to some extent on the level of indebtedness in
Romania. Here, denitive and timely data is diult to ome by. The best
we ould loate was the OECDSTAT database (http://stats.oed.org/wbos/
Default.aspx?userontext=soureoed), where annual data to 2006 implies
that Romania's aggregate debt to GDP ratio is even worse than that for the
USA, both in terms of magnitude and its rate of inrease. This suggests that
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Romania ould fae a debt-driven downturn in aggregate demand when the
rate of hange of debt falls, in addition to a diminution in export demand.
Long term Australian eonomi data implies that this will be no ordinary
reession. Australia's Reserve Bank assembled a long term data series on
the debt to GDP ratio, whih shows that Australia's eonomi performane
sine 1965 has been driven by a debt bubble whih is the third and by far
the biggest in its eonomi history.
Figure 9: Data soures: [1℄, [4℄
It is likely that the same applies to the USA: that today's private debt
levels are the largest in the history of apitalism, and that what we are
experiening now is a repeat of the proesses that gave rise to earlier nanial
panis.
As Mark Twain famously remarked, "history doesn't repeat, but it sure
does rhyme", and Australia's eonomi history gives strong reason to expet
something far more severe than a mere reession. The bursting of Australia's
two previous histori debt bubbles-in 1892 and 1931--ushered in not merely
reessions, but Depressions (long term data on real GDP growth, money sup-
ply hange and ination implies that the USA also experiened a Depression
in the 1890s--see Keen 2008A). Yet the debt levels then were substantially
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less than today's. It appears that the existene of Central Banks that, as
in the ase of the US's Federal Reserve, respond to nanial rises by trying
to "save the private setor from itself", may atually have ontributed to
a "moral hazard" dilemma that has allowed debt levels to exeed previous
bounds.
If history is any guide, then without Central Bank ativism-suh as
the resue of Long Term Capital Management, and the aggressive utting of
reserve rates during the 1990s reessionit is likely that the 1990s bubble
would have marked the peak of private debt aumulation (at 125 perent
of GDP for the USA, and 85 perent for Australia). That in itself would
have been bad enough, given the historial reordgiven the aftermaths of
the previous two bubbles. But with today's debt levels, we truly are in
unpreedented territory.
We are not saying that a global Depression is inevitable, beause there
are other aspet of the modern eonomi and soial system that dier sub-
stantially to that of 1930 and 1890. Bank ollapses and the destrution of
depositors savings, whih were a feature of the 1890s in Australia (and the
1930s in Ameria), will not reur; and government soial seurity payments
during a downturn will provide households with ash ows that an be used
to servie debt, something that did not happen in 1930.
But there will inevitably be an extended period of redued vitality to
aggregate demand, as inome is hanneled to pay debt levels down from
today's unpreedented levels to something loser to the 20-60 perent of GDP
level that appears sustainable in the long run. In Australia and Ameria's
ases, suh a redution in private debt would require more than an entire
year's GDP to be direted simply at debt redution. Sine that annot be
done in one hit, this implies a long period where demand will grow more
slowly than apaity to produe output rises.
2 The Ponzi Credit Dynami
The Australian long term data indiates that there is something systemi in
Western eonomies that leads to periodi debt explosions, and subsequent
serious debt-driven downturns. The most ogent theory to explain this phe-
nomenon is the "Finanial Instability Hypothesis", whih was developed by
the Amerian eonomist Hyman Minsky in the late 1950s and early 1960s
(see Keen 1995, 2008B). A key aspet of Minsky's model was the existene of
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"Ponzi naning", in whih individual speulators use borrowed money to
buy assets, and then attempt to prot by selling them to other speulators
for a higher prie.
1
This behavior is dependent on asset pries rising faster than ommodity
pries, and requires that debt rise faster stilland this has learly been the
ase in most OECD eonomies in the last 3 deades. This in turn requires
a nanial system that willingly generates debt, up to a point at whih the
debt burden auses a risis that suddenly stems the ow of redita "redit
runh".
Conventional models of money reation--whih argue that the banking
system does no more than amplify the monetary reation proesses of the
Central Bankannot explain this proess, and in any ase fail to aount for
the empirial data whih shows that redit money reation atually preedes
the reation of Central Bank money by up to one year (Kydland and Presott
1990). A far more ogent explanation is given by the Ciruitist Shool model
of endogenous money reation (Graziani 1989, 2004). Reently one of us
(Keen 2007) has developed a mathematial model of this proess in a pure
redit eonomy.
The model explains how money is endogenously reated, why banks are
motivated to extend redit indenitely, and what happens to aggregate de-
mand when a redit runh ours. It is easily developed from a "double-
entry book-keeping" table of the ows between aounts that are initiated
by a loan from a bank to a rm to nane prodution.
The model is developed in more detail in Keen 2008C (see also Chapman
& Keen 2006). Here we will stik with a simpler presentation for the sake of
exposition. A bank loan to a rm reates two aounts: a reord of debt F
L
,
and a deposit aount for the rm F
D
. An initial loan thus instantly reates
a mathing deposit, and also sets up interest payment obligations between
the bank and the rm: the rm is obliged to pay interest on the outstanding
debt, while the bank is obliged to pay interest on the urrent level of the
rm's deposit aount (the rates dier of ourse, with the rate of interest on
loans r
L
exeeding that on deposits r
D
.). The funds ow between the rm's
and the bank's deposit aounts, as shown in the rst row of Table One.
Table One: A model of endogenous money reation
1
With very little irony, subprime lending an be summarized as a sheme to make
money by lending money to people who ouldn't aord to repay it. It is thus a lassi
Ponzi Sheme, and the wonder is not that it ollapsed, but that anyone ould take the
Sheme seriously when it was rst mooted.
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Assets Liabilities
Aount
Type
Loans Res-
erves
Sum Deposits Sum
Name FL BR
∑
FD BD WD
∑
Interest rD ·FD−
rL · FL
rL ·FL−
rD · FD
0
Wages − (1− s)
· P · FD
(1− s) ·
P · FD
0
Interest −rD ·
WD
rD ·WD 0
Cons-
umption
β ·BD +
ω ·WD
−β · BD −ω ·WD 0
New
Loans
nM ·
FD
nM ·
FD
nM · FD nM ·
FD
Repay-
ment
−RL ·
FD
RL ·
FD
0 −RL ·
FD
−RL ·
FD
Re-
lending
LR ·
BR
−LR ·
BR
0 LR · BR LR ·
BR
One the rm has money it its deposit aount, it an hire workers to
produe output. The ow of wages from rms to workers goes into the
workers deposit aount W
D
; this is the seond row in the table.
Workers therefore have positive bank balanes, and they too reeive in-
terest on these balanes from the bank; this is the third row in the table.
Workers and bankers then buy ommodities from the rm, resulting in
expenditure ows from the B
D
andW
D
aounts to the rm's deposit aount
F
D
: this is the fourth row in the table. The arguments β and ω represent
the rates of ow per annum out of eah aount, relative to the balanes at
any time.
The next row in the table explains how money is endogenously reated.
In the real world, rms negotiate lines of redit with banks, whih enable
them to undertake expenditures--and thus eetively reate money in the
aounts of other rms--whih the banks reord as a mathing inrease in
their outstanding debt levels. In the aggregate, this results in a simultaneous
inrease in Firms deposits and rms reorded debt levels. Unlike the previous
rows in the table, this results in a net inrease in both bank liabilities
the sum of outstanding bank depositsand bank assets. The argument n
M
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represents the rate at whih the money supply expands eah year.
The next two rows reord loan repayment ows from rms to banks, and
the ow of bank reserves from banks to rms--eetively, thereyling of
loans that have previously been repaid. Both these transation ows involve
transfers from the liability to the asset side of the bank's ledger, but on
the asset side itself they simply result in the form of assets hanging: from
loans (whih generate an inome ow to the bank) to reserves (whih, being
inative, do not generate an inome ow to the bank). The arguments R
L
and L
R
represent the annual rate of loan repayment and the annual rate of
reserve reyling per annum respetively.
We an now derive a dynami model of endogenous money reation simply
by adding up the olumns in the above table. Eah olumn represents the
ows into and out of a given aount. We thus have the following set of ou-
pled dierential equations desribing the basi dynamis of money reation
in a pure redit eonomy:
d
dt
FL = nM · FD − RL · FD + LR ·BR
d
dt
BR = RL · FD − LR · BR
d
dt
FD = rD · FD − rL · FL − w · FD + β · BD + ω ·WD + nM · FD − RL · FD + LR ·BR
d
dt
BD = rL · FL − rD · FD − rD ·WD − β · BD
d
dt
WD = w · FD + rD ·WD − ω ·WD
The model an now be used to explain why banks are predisposed to
generate as muh redit as borrowers are willing to absorb up until a debt
risis ours, and also to show what happens when the system shifts from
expanding redit to a redit runh.
On the rst issue, bank inome rises if the rate of money reation n
M
and
the rate of loan reyling L
R
rise, while it falls if the rate of loan repayment
R
L
rises. Banks therefore have a vested interest in inreasing the rate of
money reation, inreasing the rate of reirulation of their reserves, and
disouraging borrowers from repaying loans.
Of ourse, as urrent eonomi onditions are now reminding us, this
state of aairs does not persist when loan defaults grow, and banks beome
onerned that lending more money will lead not to more prots, but to
apital losses. The shift in sentiment we an now see in the USA, from
proigate lending to a redit runh, involves a reversal in the above three
key parameters: banks redue the rate at whih they reate new money, the
reirulation of existing reserves slows, and borrowers try to redue their
indebtedness.
Figures 10 and 11 show this proess with a doubling of the rate at whih
borrowers attempt to repay loans, and a halving of both the rate of reiru-
lation of existing loans and of the rate of reation of new money.
2
The eet
is a preipitous drop in money in irulation-whih neessarily redues the
rate of eonomi ativity.
Figure 10:
Bank assets nonetheless ontinue to grow (though extending the model to
inlude bankrupty would hange this detail), but there is a dramati shift
from ative assets (loans) to inative ones (reserves).
The system does stabilize and return to growth after a relatively short
2
The initial loan value is $100, and parameter values before the redit runh are:
r
L
=5%; r
D
=3%; β=1; ω=26; n
M
=10% R
L
=2; and L
R
=2.
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period, but this is at a dramatially lower level of both ative money and
eonomi ativity.
Clearly, a proess like this is urrently underway in the USA, and given the
interonnetedness of the world nanial system and the extent to whih the
rest of the OECD is also debt-enumbered, it is only a matter of time before
the same proess manifests itself worldwide. There will be attenuating eets
from ountries whih are net global reditorssuh as China and Japanor
whih have not indulged in the orgy of Ponzi naning (suh as Frane), but
these are unlikely to be suient to ounter the negative impat of both the
redit runh, and the maroeonomi impat of debt redution on aggregate
demand.
Figure 11:
Romania, having only just ompleted the transition from a soialist to
a market eonomy, may therefore have to prepare itself for yet another eo-
nomi shok as the global apitalist system beomes mired in a debt trap.
We an have some modern guidane as to what this might mean for the eon-
omy from the experiene of Japan, whih as noted earlier, is an important
exeption to the general debt to GDP rule indiated in Figure Two.
This is beause though, from the graph, Japan has the lowest rate of
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growth of debt relative to GDP, this is only beause Japan entered a debt-
deation seventeen years ago, when its Bubble Eonomy ollapsed at the
end of the 1980s. Japan's private debt to GDP ratio has fallen substantially
sine 1990though the OECD Stat gures are not diretly omparable to
the Australian and US data used above, they still imply a more than 20
perent fall in the ratio sine its peak. But this has been bought at the
ost of a seriously depressed eonomy, as shown by the OECD's Composite
Leading Indiators (CLI), whih indiate urrent living standards and allow
ross-ountry omparisons to be made.
Figure 12: Data Soures: [18℄
Whereas Japan was far ahead of the USA on the CLI sale in 1990, when
the Bubble Eonomy ollapsed, Japan's eonomi performane stalledand
by 2004, Amerian living standards had moved ahead of Japan's. Japanese
living standards today are no better than they were a deade earlierwhereas
previously, living standards improved by up to 50 perent every deade.
There are doubtless other fators that have ontributed to this stagnation,
but the debt risis of the early 1990s and its long-running aftermath are key
to understanding why, in 1990, the sun stopped rising in the land of the rising
19
sun.
When Japan's risis ourred, many Western eonomists blamed it on the
lak of transpareny of the Western (and in partiular, Amerian) nanial
system, and argued that Japan's risis simply ouldn't our in the West,
beause of its higher nanial standards and superior nanial innovation.
Today's risis may show that this was simply Amerian hubris: Japan's 1990s
risis was aused by a speulative bubble foused on real estate, and Ameria
has learly followed suit in the subsequent deades.
3 No way to run an eonomy
Though a market eonomy is learly preferable to a entrally planned one
from Romania's own experiene, there is something somewhat insane in a
system that allows itself to be periodially despoiled by pointless speulation
on housing, and exessive debt aumulation. Is this phenomenon something
that one must aept as inevitably a part of a apitalist system, or is there
something that ould be done to stop, or at least attenuate, this proess in
the future?
There are ways in whih some nanial instability in apitalism is in-
evitable. As Minsky one remarked, "stability is destabilizing", beause a
period of tranquil growth leads investors to revise their risk expetations,
thus leading to aelerating growth and the aumulation of debt.
However, muh of the long-term runup in debt has nothing to do with
atual investment, but instead involves pure speulation on asset pries. This
in turn is possible beause, when an asset bubble takes hold, a disonnet
develops between asset pries and the inome ows those assets generate:
share pries rise muh faster than orporate earnings, while house pries rise
faster than the rents. We need some means to attenuate the willingness of
banks to fund speulation on shares and houses when suh bubbles arise.
One possible means with housing would be to limit the seurity that a
lender an get over a house to the inome that the house itself an be expeted
to generate.
At present, if a borrower defaults on a mortgage, then the lender gets
ownership of the house, and an sell it for whatever it an feth on the
market. However, it would be possible to reform lending laws so that the
nanial limit of the seurity the lender reeived was some sensible multiple
of the (atual or imputed) rental inome from the property. Lenders would
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still be able to lend as muh as they wished to a borrower, but would share
some of the risk if he overextended himself. It is feasible that this sharing of
risk ould redue the "moral hazard" that the urrent system generates, and
thereby redue the supply of redit to fund real estate speulation.
While this is not as radial a hange as the move from a soialist to a
apitalist eonomy that Romania has already undertaken, suh hanges tend
to be very hard to ahieve in a apitalist eonomy beause of the politial
power of lenders, and the many vested interests in real estate. However surely
suh a hange is worth ontemplating if the alternative is a aso like the
USA's urrent subprime risis, and an extended Depression like that whih
still dominates Japan today.
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